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Executive Summary
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Planning Unit) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), was established to 
encourage governments and international organizations 
to consider interreligious engagement – engagement with 
religious actors and interreligious dialogue and collaboration 
– as a vital policy tool to advance FoRB for all, providing 
recommendations and strategies of how to do so. 
The consultation involved 94 policy-makers, experts, religious 
and civil society representatives from the OSCE region and 
beyond (see list on page 28), who engaged in three official 
meetings in Bologna in the context of the European Academy 
of Religion (March 2018), in London (July 2018) in the UK 
Parliament at Westminster Palace and at Lambeth Palace and 
in Warsaw (September 2018) at the OSCE/ODHIR Human 
Dimension Implementation Meeting. The FoRB&FPI team 
participated in a number of additional informal meetings, 
follow-up presentations, discussions and interviews. 
Persecution and discrimination on the basis of religion 
and belief are on the rise in many parts of the world. The 
fundamental human right of freedom of religion or belief 
(FoRB) is in crisis. In response to growing persecution 
and discrimination in recent years, the international 
community has committed to a broad range of efforts 
to prevent and combat intolerance based on religion or 
belief: strengthening policy tools, global advocacy efforts 
and international coordination to protect FoRB. There is, 
however, a growing feeling that the current policy approach 
is failing and that new bottom up strategies, i.e., engaging 
with local stakeholders and developing activities in response 
to local concerns, is the way forward. 
Building on this insight, a multi-stakeholder consultation 
process, led by the University of Sussex (FoRB&FPI) and run 
under the patronage of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship 
in partnership with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Policy 
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•   Interreligious engagement strategies – engagement and 
partnership with interreligious actors, groups, coalitions, 
platforms and activities – are crucial policy tools 
internationally to advance human rights, including FoRB, 
combat intolerance and discrimination based on religion or 
belief and foster the development of peaceful and inclusive 
societies (SDG 16). 
•   By creating opportunities for positive interactions between 
individuals, creating spaces for dialogue and identifying 
common ground, interreligious dialogue and collaboration 
has the potential to strengthen mutual understanding 
between different, and traditionally hostile, communities 
and, thereby, improve societal cohesion and foster new 
forms of active citizenship participation.
•   Interreligious engagement strategies can include a variety 
of forms of interreligious dialogue and collaboration ranging 
from theological exchanges to day-to-day socializing and 
common social action by different religious, spiritual and 
philosophical groups and individuals. All these forms can 
be impactful in advancing FoRB depending on issues and 
contexts provided that the policy design and implementation 
have carefully linked the local with the global level and the 
secular with the religious dimension.
•   States should seek to facilitate and provide an infrastructure 
or environment to enable interreligious engagement to 
take place, yet, States must not monopolize this practice 
and must also allow religious communities to organize 
interreligious dialogue and collaboration. 
•   In facilitating interreligious engagement, States must respect 
the human rights of participants and remain neutral and 
impartial in matters of FoRB. This includes not discriminating 
between religious communities, not seeking to coerce 
communities to participate against their will and not seeking 
to influence religious doctrine. 
•   The choice of language adopted during interreligious 
engagement activities to advance FoRB should be context 
dependent. In some instances, religious language may be 
more effective than the language of human rights.
K E Y  M E S S A G E S 
•   In order to fulfil their obligations under the international 
human rights law framework, States must take steps to 
prevent interference with the right to FoRB by non-State 
actors. At an international level, interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration has been recognised as a key way to achieve 
the full protection of FoRB and as an obligation of OSCE 
participating States.
•   Both quantitative and qualitative indicators and evidence 
point unequivocally towards the fact that respect for FoRB 
has been continuing to deteriorate globally. In particular, 
recent years have seen the growth of a worrying trend 
of social hostility between communal groups throughout 
the world. This report highlights negative stereotyping, 
stigmatization, hate speech, intolerance and communal 
violence based on religion or belief, characterized by a 
growing role of societal actors as FoRB violators, in the 
context of the indirect failure of the State to protect this right 
or instability of fragile-States and regional conflicts.
•   Despite recent efforts to protect FoRB through foreign policy 
tools, global advocacy efforts and international coordination, 
this approach has largely been unsuccessful. Top down 
advocacy approaches must be complemented by bottom up 
developmental strategies. Governments and international 
organisations must support innovative partnerships with 
various FoRB stakeholders on the ground such that 
development interventions actively address religious or 
belief discrimination, support coexistence beyond sectarian 
lines, and promote inclusivity in religiously heterogeneous 
communities.
•   Religious engagement in foreign policy is a call for a new 
dialogue and mutual learning between secular and religious 
institutions in the acknowledgement and respect of their 
different domains, responsibilities and missions, but in 
the realization that collaboration and partnership may be 
essential to tackle new global challenges and to strengthen 
the common good.
The key assumption of this report is that religious actors 
should not only be seen by policy makers as the victims 
or the perpetrators of FoRB violations, but as partners in 
building long-term strategies to advance FoRB for all and 
to foster pluralism, social cohesion and sustainable peace. 
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1 Article 18 Universal Declaration Of Human Rights GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 At 71 (1948) (UDHR).
2 Article 18 UDHR; Article 18 International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights 999 UNTS 171, Entered Into Force 23 March 1976 (ICCPR); Article 9 Convention For The Protection Of 
Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms CETS No 005, Entered Into Force 3 September 1953 (ECHR).
3 OSCE, ‘Helsinki Final Act 1975’, VII Para 1, 3; OSCE, ‘Concluding Document Of The Madrid Meeting 1980 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security 
And Co-Operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up to the Conference’, Questions Relating To Security In Europe, Par. 12, 13 
And 14 ; OSCE, ‘Concluding Document Of The Third Follow-Up Meeting, Vienna, 4 November 1986 To 19 January 1989, ‘Questions Relating To Security In Europe’ Paras 11, 16, 17;  
OSCE, Document Of The Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE Ar. 9.4 And 18.1-18.6; OSCE, ‘Budapest Document 1994 Towards a Genuine 
Partnership in a New Era’ Chapter VIII, Par. 27 And OSCE, ‘Istanbul Document 1999’ Charter For European Security, Par. 19. 
4 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration And Programme Of Action, 12 July 1993, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, Part I, Para 5.
5 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 Para 31. See Also, HRC, ‘General Comment No 22’ On ‘The Right To Freedom Of Thought, Conscience And Religion (Art. 18)’ UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 Para 2. 
6 Article 18 Universal Declaration On Human Rights.
7 A Krishnaswami, Study Of Discrimination In The Matter Of Religious Rights And Practices, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, 17.
8 HRC, ‘General Comment No 22’ on ‘The Right To Freedom Of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18)’ UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 Para 4.
9 Article 18(3) ICCPR. See also article 29 UDHR.  
10 M Nowak, UN Covenant On Civil And Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd Edn, NP Engel 2005) 411.
11 SE Berry, ‘A “Good Faith” Interpretation Of The Right To Manifest Religion? The Diverging Approaches Of The European Court Of Human Rights And The UN Human Rights Committee’ 
(2017) 37 Legal Studies 672, 675.
12 See, For Example, UNGA, Interim Report Of The Special Rapporteur On Freedom Of Religion Or Belief 2 August 2016 UN Doc A/71/269  Para 23.
13 OSCE, ‘Concluding Document, Vienna’, ‘Questions Relating To Security In Europe’ Para 16.2; OSCE, ‘Budapest Document’ Chapter VIII, Par. 27 
14 UN Office On Genocide Prevention And The Responsibility To Protect, Plan Of Action For Religious Leaders And Actors To Prevent Incitement To Violence That Could Lead To Atrocity 
Crimes, 2017, 17-19.
15 UNGA, Annual Report Of The United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights Addendum Report Of The United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights On The Expert 
Workshops On The Prohibition Of Incitement To National, Racial Or Religious Hatred, Rabat Plan Of Action On The Prohibition Of Advocacy Of National, Racial Or Religious Hatred That 
Constitutes Incitement To Discrimination, Hostility Or Violence’ 11 January 2013 UN Doc A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 para 56. 
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or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance’,6 
was intended to capture all conceivable manifestations 
of religion or belief7 and has been interpreted expansively 
in practice.8 The right to manifest religion or belief is, 
however, subject to the limitations set out in international 
instruments. Specifically, limitations on this right must be 
prescribed by law and ‘necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others’.9 
The emphasis on ‘freedom’ suggests that FoRB is ‘primarily 
of a defensive nature’.10 While non-interference with FoRB 
by States was initially understood to be the core of FoRB,11  
it is increasingly recognized that States must also take steps 
to prevent interference with this right by non-State actors 
under the respect, protect, fulfill framework.12 Within the 
OSCE, participating States are obliged to ‘foster a climate 
of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of 
different communities as well as between believers and non-
believers’ in accordance with the Concluding Documents 
of the Vienna Meeting 1983 and the Budapest Meeting 
1994.13 At the UN level there is increasing recognition of the 
need to engage religious leaders and actors,14 alongside civil 
society organisations,15 in order to ensure the realisation of 
the right to FoRB in practice. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.1  
Article 18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(FoRB) is enshrined in article 18 of the UDHR and multiple 
international and regional human rights instruments, 
that apply to States in the OSCE region2 as well as OSCE 
Concluding Documents.3 As human rights are ‘universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’, FoRB 
forms part of the international human rights framework and 
should not be dissociated from other rights. Specifically, 
the mutually reinforcing nature of FoRB and the freedoms 
of expression, assembly and association must be 
acknowledged.4
The right to FoRB encompasses an internal and external 
element. The internal element, the right to hold a religion 
or belief, is to be broadly construed and encompasses not 
only traditional religious beliefs but all theistic, atheistic 
and non-theistic beliefs as well as the right not to believe.5 
Similarly, the external element, the right to manifest ‘religion 
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protecting this rights; 3) the Fragile-state/Conflict level which 
emphasizes the situation of degeneration of FoRB violation 
into sectarian and communal violence in the context of 
collapsing/fragile-states and regional instability. 
1 .  S T A T E / G O V E R N M E N T A L  L E V E L
The human right of FoRB can be violated by laws or policies 
that prohibit or restrict apostasy, blasphemy, proselytism, 
registration of religious communities, places of worship, and 
religious symbols in the public sphere. Increasingly “anti-
extremism” laws (or protecting national security) are used as 
a tool to curtail FoRB. State agents may incite to religious 
violence or actively discriminate against members of specific 
religious or belief communities. Often these violations 
affect religious minorities but victims can be also different 
vulnerable groups: non-religious groups/individuals (atheists) 
and majority-religions oppressed by authoritarian states.
2 .  N O N - S T A T E / S O C I E T A L  L E V E L
The human right of FoRB can be violated by negative 
stereotyping, stigmatization, hate speech, intolerance 
and discrimination based on religion or belief. This form 
of religious or belief discrimination are part of a worrying 
growing social trend throughout the world, thriving on the 
crises of established collective identities, concerns about 
social cohesion exacerbated by other social conditions 
including economic insecurity. In turn, this results in 
‘othering’, that is, the construction of the self-identity 
through the opposition to a negative-valued, dangerous or 
threatening Other.
3 .  F R A G I L E - S T A T E / C O N F L I C T  L E V E L
The human right of FoRB can be violated as part of sectarian 
and communal political violence between religious groups 
or groups defined also by a religious element in the context 
of fragile/collapsing states and regional instability. These are 
cases in which the intensity of the FoRB violation becomes 
associated with political violence and may take the shape 
of intra-state conflict and humanitarian crises. Often these 
are complex political conflicts and struggles for power where 
a prominent and acute role of FoRB violators is taken by 
non-state actors in a context of the de facto absence of the 
legitimate authority of a state. 
Religious persecution and discrimination appear to be on 
the rise in many parts of the world. In the foreign policy and 
legal language, the fundamental human right of FoRB is in 
crisis. It is threatened by religious extremist movements, 
secular oppressive governments, and different combinations 
of actors and ideologies, which affects many religious 
believers, across all religious and belief communities 
including atheists. Both quantitative and qualitative 
indicators and evidence point unequivocally towards the fact 
that respect for FoRB has been continuing to deteriorate. 
According to Pew Research Center, in terms of longer-term 
trends, the median score of the government Restrictions on 
Religion Index has increased in all regions of the world since 
the Center elaborated this index and released its first data 
in 2007.16 
As the last 2018 report of the USCIRF states, “This ongoing 
downward trend often intersected with authoritarian 
practices characterized by hostility toward dissent, pluralism, 
independent media, and active civil society, or took place 
under the guise of protecting national security or countering 
terrorism”.17 Similar trends are confirmed by the recently 
released report of the the European Parliament Intergroup 
on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance, 
which also emphasises the worrying worldwide increase in 
religiously motivated violence and social hostility.18  
FoRB violations manifest in a multiplicity of ways. Thinking in 
terms of a continuum of violation intensity, upholding FoRB 
requires combating intolerance, discrimination, persecution, 
incitement to violence, and violence against persons based 
on religion or belief. At the extreme of the continuum of 
violations of FoRB is the choice still faced unfortunately 
today by many believers to give up their religion or belief, 
face death or exile.
Violations of FoRB can be broadly categorized into two 
different, though inter-linked, dimensions: direct denial 
and interference with this right by State and the failure of 
States to sufficiently protect this right. For the purposes 
of this report, we would like to highlight three levels of 
FoRB violations: 1) the State/Governmental level, which 
reflects the direct dimension of state denial; 2) Non-State/
Societal level, which focuses on the role of societal actors 
as FoRB violators and the indirect failing role of the state in 
16 Pew Research Center, Global Restrictions on Religions, Annual Report, 2017 & 2018.
17 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (2018), Annual Report.
18 European Intergroup on FoRB and Religious Tolerance (2018), Annual Report.
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In the last few years the foreign policy tools, the global 
advocacy efforts and the international coordination to 
protect FoRB has been strengthened - e.g. the creation 
of new observatories (France and Italy), new offices and 
roles (Norway, Canada, UK, Denmark, Germany and EU), 
new resolutions and guidelines (UN HRC Res 31/26, 
EU FoRB guidelines) as well as new multinational and 
transnational networks such as ICGFoRB (diplomats) and 
IPPFoRB (parliamentarian).19 These initiatives have different 
characteristics and aims, which sometimes reflect different 
conceptions of FoRB and state-religions arrangements and 
have contributed to the creation of a dense network of 
FoRB-related bodies that can be mapped in the following 
groups according to their declared aims20:
A )  M O N I T O R I N G  A N D 
I N F O R M I N G 
A first group aims at providing 
information about the situation of FoRB 
in different countries. In this framework 
monitoring and evaluating the social 
and legal developments that can affect 
the respect of FoRB provides a sound 
basis of data and knowledge to inform 
public opinion and the work of political, 
cultural and religious actors. 
E X A M P L E S  A R E : 
The Observatoire Pharos, created in 
France in 2012 and the Observatory on 
Religious Minorities in the World and 
on the Respect for Religious Freedom 
created in Italy in 2017. Both initiatives 
were conceived as partnerships 
between the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and civil societies.
B )  A S S I S T I N G
 
A second group is comprised by the 
international organizations that provide 
legal assistance to countries that are 
in the process of legislating on FoRB, 
with the aim to bring national provision 
in line with international instruments 
protecting FoRB. 
E X A M P L E S  A R E : 
The OSCE-ODIHR Panel of Experts 
on FoRB and the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission.
C )  P R O M O T I N G  A N D 
D E F E N D I N G
Some bodies adopt a more political-
diplomatic approach to the issue of 
FoRB: their stated aim is to promote 
and, when necessary, defend FoRB 
all over the world through foreign 
policy. Collecting data, monitoring and 
evaluating activities are more directly 
connected to the implementation of 
a set of foreign policy tools aimed 
at promoting/defending FoRB, which 
can go from the discrete diplomatic 
demarches for prisoners release cases 
to raising FoRB issues in bilateral 
government-to-government dealing to 
the more mega-phone diplomacy as 
the ‘naming and shaming’ strategies. 
E X A M P L E S  A R E : 
The Office of International Religious 
Freedom of the U.S. Department 
of State and the United States 
Commission on International Religious 
Freedom; the EU Special Envoy for the 
promotion of FoRB outside the EU, and 
the FoRB special envoys of respectively 
Denmark, the UK and Germany; as well 
as the UN Special Rapporteur on FoRB, 
appointed by the UN Human Rights 
Council, who has a similar mandate.
19 Petito, F., Philpott, D., Ferrari, S. & Birdsall, J. “FoRB – Recognising our differences can be our strength: Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief”, 
Policy Brief, University of Sussex, 2016, available at http://forbforeignpolicy.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FoRB_Transatlantic_policy_briefing_2016.pdf
19 Fabio Petito is indebted for this mapping to discussions over the years with Prof Silvio Ferrari.
7In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the growing 
international constellation of FoRB initiatives and bodies, 
the last couple of years have seen the creation of important 
multinational and transnational FoRB networks such as the 
inter-governmental International Contact Group on FoRB 
(ICCFoRB), the International Panel of Parliamentarians for 
FoRB (IPPFoRB), which have strengthened the international 
coordination and cooperation respectively among Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs and Parliaments in this policy area. These 
networks have initially emerged as a way of strengthening 
the transatlantic cooperation but are now gradually 
expanding beyond the Western world as it is proved, for 
example, by the creation of the Commonwealth Initiative for 
FoRB (CIFoRB).
There is, however, a growing feeling that the current 
FoRB-protection approach appears on the whole to be 
failing. Governments have started to realize that there are 
limits to their reach and influence, particularly in matters 
of religion. Behavioural change is given effect primarily at 
the local level. Local and non-state actors are therefore 
essential. Top down approaches (i.e. high-level declaratory 
statements and government to government activity) must be 
complemented by bottom up strategies (i.e. engaging with 
local stakeholders developing activity in response to local 
concerns).21 Innovative ways of engaging on the ground and 
in a collaborative way with actors equipped to speak with 
authority about change-making regarding FoRB represent an 
important addition to traditional government-to-government 
or international organisation approaches to improve FoRB 
and to combat intolerance and discrimination worldwide. 
Therefore, governments and international organisations need 
to provide a forum where such engagement and dialogue 
can take place.22 These is also need for new innovative 
partnerships between various FoRB stakeholders and 
development agencies on the ground such that development 
interventions actively address religious discrimination 
affecting individuals and communities, support coexistence 
beyond sectarian lines, and promote inclusivity in religiously 
heterogeneous communities. Some promising examples 
of this new emerging approach are: the Istanbul Process 
and the Rabat Plan of Action, developed following the 
consensual adoption of the Resolution 16/18 on combating 
intolerance by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011; the 
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2016 Marrakesh Declaration (Muslim leaders for the right of 
religious minorities) and the 2017 Beirut Declaration  
(an interreligious platform and message to advance the role 
religious communities can play in fostering human rights 
including FoRB).
As part of these new bottom up and collaborative strategies 
of engagement the key message of this report is that 
engagement with religious actors and interreligious dialogue 
and collaboration are crucial policy tools to promote FoRB 
and combat intolerance and discrimination based on religion 
or belief. Its key assumption is that religious actors should 
not only be seen by policy makers as either the victims 
or the perpetrators of FoRB violations, but as partners in 
building long-term strategies to advance FoRB for all and to 
foster pluralism, social cohesion and sustainable peace. 
This report challenges the widely held contemporary 
assumption that the growing role of religion in international 
affairs is essentially a militant and violent-prone form 
of politics, or that religion poses an inherent threat to 
international order and stability. Instead, this report assumes 
that religion is politically ambivalent: on the one hand, it 
can promote political violence and conflict, but on the other, 
also peace building, reconciliation and non-violent civic 
engagement.23  Hence somehow, by reversing the picture 
we ask: How can religious leaders, communities and other 
various religious-based organisations help governmental 
and international organisations to de-escalate violence, 
build peace and combat intolerance and discrimination 
in the context of the current crisis? This more reflexive 
and multifaceted understanding of the role of religion in 
international relations has informed a new policy oriented 
discussion, which is now often referred to as ‘religious 
engagement’ in foreign policy.
21 See the UK APPG IFoRB Report “Article 18: From Rhetoric to Reality” 2017 available at https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/media/Article-18-report-1710.pdf
22 See for example the Istanbul Process and the Rabat Plan of Action, developed following the consensual adoption of the Resolution 16/18 on combating intolerance by the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2011. More recent initiatives of this type include the 2016 Marrakesh declaration (Muslim leaders for the right of religious minorities) and the 2017 Beirut declaration (an 
interreligious platform and message to advance the role religious communities can play in fostering Human Rights including FoRB).
23 Appleby, R. S. The ambivalence of the sacred: religion, violence, and reconciliation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
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Over the past decade governments have considered the 
global resurgence of religion in international affairs as a 
specific policy challenge which requires strategic thinking 
and appropriate policy responses. As a result, more recently 
a new policy oriented discussion focusing on ‘religious 
engagement’ in foreign policy has emerged. Religious 
engagement does not refer to the simple diplomatic activity 
of ‘reaching out’ to cultivate good relations with religious 
actors. These initiatives are not new and are arguably 
part of the common diplomatic culture. Rather the idea of 
religious engagement points to a new policy strategy and 
ways in which governments and international organisations 
can engage religious non-state actors (religious leaders, 
communities and various religious-based organisations) 
abroad on a wide spectrum of global issues to promote 
humanitarian assistance, development, human rights and 
peace-building. 
Ministries of foreign affairs of countries such as France, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Italy and Hungary have started to 
strengthen their capacity to engage religion in order to 
‘make better policy and to make a bigger difference’, as the 
title of a recent conference sponsored by the UK Foreign 
Office suggests.24 An important stage in this development 
was the publication of an influential report by the Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs entitled Engaging Religious 
Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for US Foreign 
Policy.25 Critically reflecting on the failures and lessons 
learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the report shows how the 
Western community failed to understand the key role that 
local mainstream Islamic communities played in providing 
education, sanitation, and other social services when the 
state structure no longer existed, as is the case with a 
so-called failed state. Framing religion exclusively through 
the counter-terrorist framework prevented constructive 
engagement with religion as part of the solution to 
build stability, the central objective of the international 
community’s new comprehensive approach to security and 
development.
Based on this evaluation, the US State Department 
launched a new ‘US Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith 
Community Engagement’, which paved the way for the 
creation of the Office of Religion and Global Affairs in 2015 
within the US State Department to advise the Secretary of 
State. The aim of this new US strategy is to ‘encourage(s) 
U.S. government officials to develop and deepen their 
relationships with religious leaders and faith communities 
as they carry out their foreign policy responsibilities,’ 
and develop a more robust engagement with religious 
leaders and communities abroad specifically to promote 
development and humanitarian assistance; advance human 
rights, including FoRB; and prevent and resolve conflict.26
The concept of ‘religious engagement’ is fairly new in 
foreign policy making, and arguably is still very much a 
work in progress and open to a variety of interpretations 
and forms of national implementation. Focusing on the 
role of interreligious dialogue, it has been argued that 
religious engagement has not only the potential to improve 
the knowledge base for foreign policy but also, through 
new secular-religious partnerships, to stretch the political 
imagination and create new practical innovations to respond 
to global policy challenges.27 In any case, the new policy 
strategy of religious engagement requires a new set of skills 
and mindset for both governments and religious actors as 
the preconditions to build new capacity aimed at delivering 
innovative government-religious partnerships. A quite 
radical change of policy mindset, including the removal 
of what are increasingly described as ‘secular blind spots’ 
in governments, is needed. More importantly, religious 
engagement is a call for a new dialogue and mutual 
learning between secular and religious institutions in the 
acknowledgement and respect of their different domains, 
responsibilities and missions but in the realization that 
collaboration may be crucial to face some of the new global 
challenges and to strengthen the common good.
24 “Religion, foreign policy and development: making better policy to make a bigger difference”, Wilton Park, 5 February 2014, https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/conference/wp1311/
25 Appleby, S. and R. Cizik, eds., Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: Chicago Council, 2010.
26 https://www.state.gov/s/rga/strategy/
27 For a reflection on this perspective, see Petito, F. and S. Thomas, ‘Encounter, Dialogue and Knowledge: Italy as a Special Case of Religious Engagement in Foreign Policy’, Review of Faith 
and International Affairs 13, no. 2 (2015): 40-51 & Ferrara, P. and F. Petito, ‘An Italian Foreign Policy of Religious Engagement: Challenges and Prospects’, The International Spectator, 51 
no. 1 (2016), 28-43.
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Over the last few years, research and policy have begun to 
recognise the positive role that religious leaders can play 
in promoting peace, inclusive societies and sustainable 
development.28 This recognition has led to the creation 
of new international initiatives and global platforms of 
religious engagement to promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies in the spirit of the Sustainable Development Goal 
16, for example: The International Partnership on Religion 
and Sustainable Development (PaRD), to harness the 
positive impact of religion in sustainable development and 
28 See for example the World Bank (2015), Conference Report, Religion & Sustainable Development: Building Partnerships to End Extreme Poverty, Key Findings & Recommendations for 
Action.
29 See http://www.partner-religion-development.org/ 
30 UN Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes (2017), available at https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/
documents/publications-and-resources/Plan%20of%20Action_Religious_Prevent-Incite-WEB-rev3.pdf
31 See the UN Interagency Task Force on Engaging Faith-Based Actors for Sustainable Development Annual Report of 2016 & 2017.
32 See the U.S. Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement available at  https://www.state.gov/s/rga/strategy/ and the European Parliamentary Research Service (2017) 
‘Religion and the EU’s external policies: Increasing engagement’.
humanitarian assistance;29 and the UN led “Fez Process” 
for religious leaders to prevent incitement to violence (see 
the 2017 Plan of Action)30. In general, a more focused 
consideration of the role of religion in development has 
started to trickle down throughout the UN system31 in 
the acknowledgment that engaging religious leaders and 
communities can promote sustainable development and 
more effective humanitarian assistance, as the EU has also 
recognised in some recent policy documents.32
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Crucially for this report, engaging religious leaders and 
communities can also help to advance human rights, 
including FoRB. Religious actors must be seen as 
responsible partners in building a long-term solution to 
religious intolerance and discrimination and in fostering 
equality of rights and appreciation for religious pluralism. 
This innovative insight has been assumed as the basis 
of the Rabat Plan of Action and the Beirut Declaration, 
which have recently been institutionalised through a new 
stream of UN work in the field of human rights, i.e., the 
UN ‘Faiths for Rights’ initiative launched in 2017.33 As far 
as FoRB protection is concerned, ultimately, if it is true 
that all religions are minorities somewhere, it is then not 
inconceivable to think of majority religions in a particular 
country also as key stakeholders in protecting the freedoms 
of minority religions with regard to the State. 
Beyond PaRD, other valuable transnational policy and 
diplomatic networks have been created focusing on religion 
and diplomacy and on international freedom of religions 
of belief, such as the Transatlantic Policy Networks on 
Religion and Diplomacy (TPNRD) and the International 
Contact Group on FoRB (ICGFoRB). There is a need for 
representatives of these networks and initiatives to engage 
more in coordination, cooperation and sharing of best 
practices as recommended by a recent expert working group 
on US foreign policy convened by Georgetown University 
on the ground that “Promoting religious freedom and 
engaging religious actors are separate but complementary 
functions”.34 This is even more necessary given that 
despite greater recent recognition that religious actors 
play a significant role in the development and stability of 
contemporary societies, there is evidence that religious 
and interreligious actors are rarely welcome at the leading 
global policy tables as argued by a recent World Faiths 
Development Dialogue Report.35
Some disclaimers, however, should be in place from the 
beginning as to ‘right-sizing’ and not ‘over-charging’ the role 
of religion in this policy area. Of course recognizing that 
religions can play a positive role in tackling FoRB violations, 
does not mean that everything is reducible to religion and, 
therefore, state actors must be careful not to overcharge 
religions with tasks for which they should not have 
responsibility. Further, although religious actors must not be 
excluded from political tasks, it is vital that they do not lead 
these efforts in order to maintain the division between the 
political and religious.
If there is too much overlap between religion and power, it 
becomes difficult for religious leaders to maintain credibility. 
Further, the instrumentalised use of religious actors by 
political actors may also be problematic, as the legitimacy 
of religious actors is undermined if they are viewed as 
permitting state interference in religious matters. It must 
also be noted that the root causes of tensions between 
religious communities may not lie in religion itself. Other 
causes of tension such as socio-economic disadvantage 
must not be overlooked in efforts to increase understanding 
between religious communities. In some way, the issue of 
root causes is not what is at stake in this discussion as 
engagement with religious actors and interreligious dialogue 
and collaboration can actually be an effective tool to combat 
discrimination and persecution even if the religious factors 
are not the predominant or exclusive factors driving them.36
33 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/FaithForRights.aspx
34 Report (2018) on Engaging Religious Actors and Promoting Religious Freedom in US Diplomacy, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University available at: https://isd.
georgetown.edu/sites/isd/files/ewg_statement_july_26_-_formatted.pdf
35 Katherine Marshall (2017), Interfaith Journeys: An exploration of history, ideas, and future directions, Report, The World Faiths Development Dialogue available at https://berkleycenter.
georgetown.edu/publications/interfaith-journeys-an-exploration-of-history-ideas-and-future-directions
36 Mandaville, P. and S. Silvestri. “Integrating Religious Engagement and Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities”. Brooking Institute Issues in Governance Studies 67 (2015): 1-13.
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The key message of this report is that 
engagement with religious actors 
and interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration are crucial policy tools to 
promote FoRB and combat intolerance 
and discrimination based on religion 
or belief. Thus, we call for a change in 
the dominant policy approach adopted 
by governments and international 
organisations in response to the global 
crisis of FoRB: Religious actors should 
not only be seen by policy makers as 
either the victims or the perpetrators 
of FoRB violations, but as partners in 
building long-term strategies to advance 
FoRB for all and foster pluralism, social 
cohesion and sustainable peace.
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We use ‘interreligious engagement’ as shortcut label/formula 
for what is more precisely the interactions and combination 
of two dimensions (two words, one from each dimension): 
the vertical dimension of ‘Religious Engagement’ and the 
horizontal one of ‘Interreligious Dialogue and Collaboration’. 
As we have argued in the previous section, religious 
engagement in foreign policy relates to the vertical 
dimension of secular-religious partnership focusing on the 
way states and international organizations can engage – and 
partner with – religious non-state actors (religious leaders, 
communities and various religious-based organisations) 
to promote different policy objectives, in our case, to 
combat intolerance, discrimination and strengthen FoRB. 
In this context, the ‘interreligious’ refers to the horizontal 
dimension and to the fact that objects of policy engagement 
are specifically interreligious actors, groups, coalitions, 
platforms and activities – not a single or multiple separate 
religious actors. This distinction is made for the purpose of 
conceptual clarity and is based on the assumption that a 
demarcation of religious and political spheres is central to 
facilitating a policy of interreligious engagement, however 
the secular/religious and political/religious divides may be 
difficult to clearly define.
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The dimension of interreligious dialogue and collaboration 
focuses on the activities involving religious leaders, 
communities and other religious actors and belief 
organisations. These activities can take a multitude of 
forms ranging from theological exchanges and sharing of 
religious experience focusing on the religious and spiritual 
traditions themselves, to day-to-day socializing and practical 
collaboration and common action by different religious, 
spiritual and philosophical traditions on specific social, 
economic or political issues.37 Some activities can be formal 
and/or high-level meetings between official representatives 
often with a view to emphasize commonalities, whereas 
others can be informal and/or grassroots initiatives at the 
local level, for example, in neighbourhoods or schools.
Interreligious dialogue and collaboration as a sustained, 
global practice is a relatively new phenomenon and its 
participants and goals have widened and deepened 
significantly over the last two decades.38 Probably the 
most significant trend of this growth has seen interreligious 
dialogue moving steadily from theology to practical 
collaboration. As a recent Woolf Institute Report has 
effectively explained, while acknowledging that there are 
phenomenal challenges to go beyond formal dialogue 
among leaders and reach communities to tackle the 
pressing tensions among them: ‘Once a field of dialogue-
centred practice rooted in theological concerns, the 
interfaith movement has evolved into a concerted, if not 
always coherent, effort to mobilise religious resources to 
respond to pressing social and political issues.39
Theological exchanges and inter/intra-religious dialogue may 
be useful to isolate extremism and provide justifications 
for interreligious collaboration. Both may enable religious 
leaders to understand their religion as compatible with 
pluralism and can facilitate the identification of common 
themes across religions (i.e. human dignity) that can 
form the basis of future interreligious collaboration. It 
may be beneficial to involve extreme elements of religious 
communities in intra rather than interreligious dialogue, 
in order to avoid claims of legitimacy emanating from 
inclusion. Interreligious dialogue is clearly not enough 
to generate the anticipated outcomes of combatting 
intolerance, discrimination and strengthening FoRB but it 
can well be a pre-condition to move the focus to the need 
for interreligious collaboration and action. 
Interreligious collaboration is increasingly recognized as 
central to peace building in order to create conditions 
of peace, as well as preventative diplomacy.40 Religions 
possess resources, such as forgiveness, that the state 
does not, and therefore, collaboration between different 
religious communities involved in conflict is vital. This 
is particularly important when governance is weak e.g. 
in context of transitional justice. While there is no one-
size-fits-all to interreligious collaboration and efforts are 
context specific, there seems to be potential in a policy 
strategy of interreligious engagement to promote FoRB and 
combat intolerance and discrimination based on religion 
or belief that harnesses informal grassroots interreligious 
collaboration, with the appropriate measure of elite 
participation by high-ranking religious leaders.
Contact theory emphasizes the role that positive interactions 
between individuals play in the creation of societal cohesion 
and prejudice reduction.41 Such interactions seek ‘to 
break down prejudices, stereotypes and misconceptions of 
others, and to generate mutual understanding, reciprocal 
identification, societal trust and solidarity’.42 Consequently, 
by creating spaces for dialogue and identifying common 
ground, interreligious engagement has the potential to 
strengthen mutual understanding between different religious 
or belief communities. However, empirical research has 
shown that other factors will directly influence whether 
interreligious dialogue and collaboration will successfully 
reduce intercommunal tensions and, thereby, improve 
respect for FoRB and other human rights, namely: who is 
being engaged; how are they being engaged and what role 
does identity play in the activities. 
37 For a useful discussion of four types of interreligious dialogue inspired by the perspective of the Catholic Church, namely dialogue of life, dialogue of action, dialogue religious experience 
and dialogue of theological exchange, see The Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, (1991) ‘Dialogue and Proclamation: 
Reflections and Orientations on Interreligious Dialogue and the Proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ’, Vatican City. 
38 For a useful updated virtual platform and electronic database on interreligious dialogue see The Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) Dialogue Knowledge Hub, 
available at https://www.kaiciid.org/knowledge-hub/about-dkh
39  John Fahy and Jan-Jonathan Bock (2018), Beyond Dialogue? Interfaith Engagement in Delhi, Doha and London, Cambridge, The Wolf Institute. 
40 David R. Smock, ed., (2002) Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace; Susan Hayward (2012) Religion and Peacebuilding Reflections 
on Current Challenges and Future Prospects, USIP Special Report, 1-12; Scott Appleby, Atalia Omer, and David Little (2015), eds., The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and 
Peacebuilding, Oxford University Press. 
41 See generally, Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley, 1954). 
42 Loobuyk, ‘Towards an Intercultural Sense of Belonging Together: Reflections on the Theoretical and Political Level’ in in Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero (eds), Multiculturalism and 
Interculturalism - Debating the Dividing Lines (Edinburgh University Press, 2016) 225 at 230.
Within contact theory, it is central that the members of 
each group participating in interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration activities must have an equal status (e.g. 
religious leaders). If the outcomes of the engagement is 
to be generalizable from the individual to the group level, 
then it is important to involve participants who are likely 
to be able to influence public opinion, as a result of their 
status.43 However, participants must also be seen as 
typical members of the group and include groups that hold 
extreme views. Engagement activities must be designed 
to require participants to work towards a common goal in 
a cooperative manner (e.g. scriptural reasoning). Notably, 
conditions of competition within the dialogue activities or 
the absence of common goals are likely to increase rather 
than reduce prejudice.44 Further, social time should be built 
into engagement activities in order to develop affective 
ties.45 Additional factors such as common language and the 
voluntary nature of contact will also influence the likelihood 
that dialogue activities reduce prejudice and bias.46
If interreligious dialogue and collaboration is to successfully 
reduce prejudice and to be generalizable from the individual 
to the group level, then religious identity should be at 
the heart of such activities.47 There is a careful balancing 
act that should go in the design of such strategies of 
interreligious engagement, that can only take the form 
a contextual judgment. On the one hand, contact theory 
suggests that it may be useful to identify some common 
ground between participants and recategorize participants 
under a superordinate identity that they share, e.g. religious 
leaders.48 If religious differences are a cause of anxiety 
that may reduce participation, then activities may in the 
short term seek to make religious identity less salient. By 
generating a pleasant encounter with a perceived ‘typical’ 
member of the ‘other’, this then provides a platform 
from which to engage on religious issues. Nonetheless, 
interreligious dialogue and consultation must centre around 
religion if prejudice is to be reduced in the longer term.49 
On the other hand, in fact, these considerations should be 
balanced with the acknowledgment that recent empirical 
research on the relationship between religious identity 
and violence/peace seem to suggest – rather paradoxically 
one could say – that religiously-inspired violence and 
antagonism is often characterised by doctrinally ‘weak’ and 
superficial religious identities – if not religious ignorance and 
indifference – as these are the most conducive substratum 
to violent politicisation by political entrepreneurs. In contrast 
doctrinally ‘strong’ religious identities – rooted in a culture 
and nurtured by an intergenerational process of transmission 
of tradition – would seem to be more common amongst 
religious actors committed to conflict-resolution and peace 
building (religious peacebuilding) in so far they retain their 
credibility and authenticity as ‘religious actors’.50
The insights provided by contact theory and in particular, the 
potential for interreligious engagement to improve relations 
between traditionally hostile communities and positively 
impact respect for human rights has been recognized in 
academic literature51 and was supported by evidence from 
both religious representatives, international organisations 
and civil society stakeholders during the consultations that 
have informed this report. 
15
43 Cuhadar and Dayton, ‘The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: From Theory to Practice’ (2011) 12 International Studies Perspectives 273, 287
44 Sherif, In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Inter-group Conflict and Cooperation (Houghton Mifflin 1966).
45 Cuhadar and Dayton, ‘The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: From Theory to Practice’ (2011) 12 International Studies Perspectives 273, 286
46 Wagner and Mechleit, ‘”Gastarbeiter” in the Federal Republic of Germany: Contact between Germans and Migrant Populations’ in Hewstone and Brown, Contact and Conflict in Inter-
group Encounters (Basil Blackstone, 1986).
47 Cuhadar and B Dayton, ‘The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: From Theory to Practice’ (2011) 12 International Studies Perspectives 273-288. 
48 See, generally, Cuhadar, ‘Assessing Transfer from Track Two Diplomacy: The Cases of Water and Jerusalem (2009) 46 Journal of Peace Research 641-658.
49 Cuhadar and B Dayton, ‘The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: From Theory to Practice’ (2011) 12 International Studies Perspectives 273-288. 
50 Petito F, ‘In Defence of Dialogue of Civilizations: With a Brief Illustration of the Diverging Agreement between Edward Said and Louis Masignon’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 39:3 (2011), 759–79.
51 Berry, ‘Aligning Interculturalism with International Human Rights Law: “Living Together” without Assimilation’  (2018) 18 Human Rights Law Review 441. 
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The Role of States
This report outlines how interreligious engagement can 
be operationalised by States at both a domestic level and 
through their foreign policy, in order to improve respect 
for FoRB and in fulfillment of their obligations under 
international human rights law. In the context of article 
18 ICCPR, it has been asserted by the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner 
Bielefeldt that States have an obligation to build ‘societal 
resilience against religious intolerance’.52
At the Twentieth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial 
Council in Kiev the significance of ‘interfaith and 
interreligious dialogue and partnerships for the 
protection of FoRB was explicitly recognised in 
Decision No. 3/13, where participating States were 
called upon to 
Promote and facilitate open and transparent 
interfaith and interreligious dialogue and 
partnerships; 
Aim to prevent intolerance, violence and 
discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, 
including against Christians, Jews, Muslims 
and members of other religions, as well as 
against non-believers, condemn violence 
and discrimination on religious grounds and 
endeavour to prevent and protect against 
attacks directed at persons or groups based on 
thought, conscience, religion or belief; 
Encourage the inclusion of religious and belief 
communities, in a timely fashion, in public 
discussions of pertinent legislative initiatives; 
Promote dialogue between religious or belief 
communities and governmental bodies, 
including, where necessary, on issues related 
to the use of places of worship and religious 
property.53 
However, it is challenging for States to strike the appropriate 
balance between facilitating interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration and not undermining the individual right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and other 
human rights obligations. Nonetheless, many of the best 
practices identified during the consultation process provide 
clear guidance and simultaneously align closely with State 
obligations under international human rights law. 
Rather than seeking to lead or influence interreligious 
engagement, the primary role for States, identified through 
our consultation process, is to facilitate and provide an 
infrastructure or environment that allows interreligious 
engagement to take place. The State can further provide 
financial or political support for interreligious engagement 
activities and places within the state’s purview can 
provide ideal fora for interreligious engagement activities, 
e.g. schools, universities or museums. The former UN 
Special Rapporteur on FoRB, Heiner Bielefeldt has 
identified opportunities for States to facilitate interreligious 
engagement. These include a range of complementary 
initiatives encompassing formal and informal interreligious 
dialogue, ‘that is, dialogue projects undertaken explicitly 
under the auspices of religious differences as well as 
forms of communication in which people meet without 
necessarily displaying their respective religious identities’.54 
By facilitating interreligious engagement in this way, States 
fulfil both their obligations to secure the right to FoRB. 
However, it must be emphasized that the State must not 
have a monopoly in this respect, and interreligious dialogue 
and collaboration organized by religious communities or civil 
society must be allowed to take place.
However, there is a balance to be struck by States between 
facilitating interreligious engagement and not violating the 
individual right to FoRB. In particular, it is important that 
States should not try to influence religious doctrine or 
undertake activities that can be construed as prioritising 
one religious or belief community over another. As a result, 
the role of the State ‘as the neutral and impartial organiser 
52 Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief A/71/269  2 August 2016 para 23
53 Decision no. 3/13 Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief (MC.DEC/3/13 of 6 December 2013).
54 Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt  UN doc A/HRC/25/58 26 December 2013 para 46.
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of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs’,55 
remains paramount. If States seek to operationalize 
interreligious engagement to further a political agenda 
or legitimize differential treatment between religious 
communities, interreligious engagement is unlikely to 
achieve its aims. Furthermore, interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration should not be high jacked by governments and/
or majority-religions as an official public relations exercise to 
respond to criticisms of State and societal violations of FoRB 
in specific states.
The role of the State as a facilitator of interreligious dialogue 
and collaboration must be distinguished from the legal 
relationship of the state with religious communities. States 
must not seek to coerce representatives from religious 
communities to participate in interreligious engagement 
against their will. In particular, official recognition of religious 
communities must not be tied to participation in the 
interreligious engagement process. Although inclusivity is a 
central principle of interreligious engagement, the right to 
freedom of association must be respected. Coercion is likely 
to undermine the effectiveness of interreligious engagement 
as a tool to break down barriers and stereotypes between 
religious communities, by breeding resentment. However, 
States should leave the door open for non-participating 
religious communities to participate in interreligious 
engagement at a future time. 
While States can facilitate interreligious engagement, in 
order to comply with FoRB, States must remain neutral and 
impartial in matters of FoRB, and must not discriminate 
between religious communities.56 This must not be 
interpreted to require secularism but, nonetheless, it is 
clear that States should not seek to reinterpret religions, 
seek to impose solutions in intra-religious disputes or 
answer theological questions.57 Notably, while theological 
debate and inter/intra-religious dialogue may be useful to 
isolate extremism and provide justifications for interreligious 
collaboration, this must be led by religious actors and not 
the state and/or political actors, if it is to be effective.
As a matter of principle, State facilitated interreligious 
dialogue and collaboration processes should seek to 
ensure that no religious or belief (including non-believers) 
communities are excluded from participation. However, 
from a pragmatic perspective, in some instances it may be 
beneficial to restrict participation to interested parties when 
interreligious dialogue or collaboration seeks to address 
a specific cause of tension between 2 or 3 religious or 
belief communities. It is important to engage not only with 
moderate voices but also those holding more extreme or 
illiberal views. In engaging with these groups, the State must 
be clear that participation does not connote endorsement. 
Nonetheless, these extreme voices must be able to 
speak freely, in accordance with the right to freedom of 
expression which includes ‘the right to express views that 
offend, shock or disturb’,58 if interreligious engagement 
is to be meaningful. In accordance with international 
obligations in relation to gender mainstreaming, States 
should seek to ensure the presence of women, particularly 
female community leaders, in interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration. 
55 Leyla Șahın v. Turkey, 10 November 2005, European Court of Human Rights, No. 44774/98, para 107. See also, UN HRC, ‘General Comment No 22’ on ‘The Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18)’ UN doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 10. 
56 UN HRC, ‘General Comment No 22’ on ‘The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18)’ UN doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 2.
57 Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, 16 December 2004, European Court of Human Rights, No. 39023/97 para. 96; Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church para. 120. 
58 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5493/72 para 49. 
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Interreligious Engagement and the Secular 
Language of Human Rights
A common theme during the consultation process 
concerned the use of the secular language of human rights 
and whether this is conducive to effective interreligious 
engagement. Ultimately, stakeholders engaged in the 
consultation process emphasised that the choice of 
language adopted during interreligious engagement activities 
should be context dependent. In some instances, it may 
be strategic to use alternatives to the language of FoRB 
and human rights in order to convey the same message 
but in culturally congruent ways. In some contexts religious 
language may be more effective than the language of 
human rights. For example, in some non-Western contexts 
expressions like inter-communal harmony and inter-religious 
respect may be used to express genuine concern for FoRB. 
Further, the choice of language is also dependent on 
the nature of the actors involved. If diplomats and policy 
makers are to be seen as trustworthy actors in this field, 
they should avoid any perception of favoritism. In this 
case, reliance on the secular language of human rights 
might be more appropriate. At the same time, however, 
this process should require an improved religious literacy in 
government. Policy makers should be able to understand the 
religious perspectives and constraints of religious actors for 
interreligious engagement strategies to be successful.  
By providing a common framework that transcends specific 
religious traditions, human rights standards are able to 
provide a basis for interreligious engagement. This may be 
particularly useful in a religiously charged environment. On 
the other hand, the language of human rights may not be 
familiar or appropriate in a local context. Further, human 
rights may be viewed as a Western import. Although the 
legitimacy of this assertion was strenuously rejected by a 
number of stakeholders during consultations, this perception 
may still undermine interreligious engagement and should 
not be disregarded. Instead, stakeholders suggested framing 
issues in terms of common human and spiritual principles 
or values, where consensus between religious and belief 
communities can easily be found.59 A key example in this 
respect is the concept of dignity, which has both secular and 
religious meaning. Similarly, rights can be translated through 
the local culture, for example in some Asian contexts FoRB 
concerns could be more effectively discussed in terms of 
interreligious harmony. 
59 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, European Court of Human Rights, No. 5493/72 para 49. 
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Rather than viewing the language of human rights and the 
language of religion as in opposition, they can be viewed as 
mutually reinforcing. The UN Faith for Rights Initiative and, in 
particular, the 18 commitments drafted under this initiative 
that provide religious justifications for the protection of 
FoRB evidence that the secular language or rights and the 
language of religion are not necessarily opposed.60 In fact, 
scriptural reasoning activities, in the form of religious leaders 
working cooperatively together for the common purpose 
of identifying religious justifications for the protection of 
human rights, have potential as interreligious engagement 
strategies. There is an enormous unexplored repository 
of cultural and religious resources and arguments to 
advance FoRB and combat discrimination based on religion 
or belief from within and across religious traditions and 
creating the conditions for their global emergence and local 
implementation through interreligious engagement strategies 
has significant impact potential. 
Strategies of interreligious engagement have also the 
potential to contribute, in the public sphere of liberal-
democratic societies, to a new post-secular sensitivity 
accepting that the moral intuitions of religions and 
spiritualties may become important resources to cure 
the pathologies of modernization, including the crisis 
of an individualistic system of relations, which prevents 
the construction of real and strong communities.61 In 
this context, interreligious dialogue and collaboration 
become one of the most dynamic and promising areas 
of active citizen participation and new socio-political 
leadership especially among young religious citizens. For 
this new generation of citizens, interreligious activism is 
about learning to live together and building together a 
better common society in the belief that values such as 
democracy, freedom, equality, inclusion and justice are 
not necessarily best pursued within an exclusively secular 
framework. 
Let us conclude by quoting at length some moderately 
critical remarks of a largely sympathetic participant and 
commentator to this consultation process, who effectively 
highlighted the intellectual and political challenge faced 
by our approach in the hope that it could be successfully 
solved:
Does this freedom really require interreligious engagement? 
Many religions do not share the concept of freedom of 
religion or belief that is prevailing in liberal States. Are we 
sure that involving religions in the re-shaping of this notion 
is not conducive to increasing conflicts among religions 
and between religious and secular actors? My answer is, 
it is worth trying provided religious and secular actors are 
ready to start discussing their respective philosophies and 
theologies of freedom of religion or belief. It is going to 
be a difficult dialogue because it implies asking whether 
the Islamic conception of freedom of religion or belief 
is insufficiently comprehensive, whether the Christian 
conception is too much focused on religion as a form of 
belief, or whether the Western States’ idea of this freedom 
is too much indebted to the Enlightenment philosophical 
categories. Up to now these uncomfortable questions have 
been carefully avoided in the official interreligious dialogue 
and in the diplomatic exchanges between States and faith 
groups. However, if we are not ready to address them, it 
is safer to go back to the idea of mutual respect, which 
does not require the level of commitment implicit in the 
engagement. These are the challenges we need to face. 
There are no easy solutions but getting aware of what 
expects us is the first step to answer them.62
60 UN OHCHR, ‘18 Commitments on “Faith for Rights”’ <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/21451/18CommitmentsonFaithforRights.pdf> accessed 20 November 2018. 
61 Habermas, J and et al, 2010. An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age (Cambridge: Polity Press)
62  Silvio Ferrari, discussant’s comments to the panel ‘Benefits, Conditions, Challenges and Risks of Interreligious Engagement (Dialogue and Collaboration) for FoRB: A New Policy Forward’, 
House of Commons, Palace of Westminster, London, 12 July 2018.
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Case Studies
The three case studies chosen for this report were selected 
to present a variety of interreligious engagement strategies, 
as well as the challenges and opportunities faced by those 
applying them on the ground. They draw from a range of 
contexts, practices and areas of the world, each providing 
insights into the complexities of interreligious engagement 
and successful project implementation. The following 
questions will guide you while reading each study:
•  What are the lessons we could draw from this successful 
project in terms of recommending to policy makers the use 
of strategies of interreligious engagement to reduce inter-
religious/communal tensions and improve respect for FoRB?
•  What is the role/partnership of the state and other 
international and public authorities in the context of this 
field project of interreligious engagement? 
•  What role did the State/other governmental authorities 
in supporting this field project? Was there any risk 
of potentially negative action, interference or lack of 
engagement? 
•  How did the religious language and interreligious dialogue 
vision in this project complement the secular framework 
and language of human rights in promoting FoRB and 
combatting discrimination? Where there any limitations or 
risks to this approach?
www.peacemakersnetwork.org 
Throughout the past decade religious minorities across the 
world, and particularly in Muslim majority countries, have 
faced tremendous persecution and existential threats due 
to an increase of terrorism and violent extremism. These 
challenges can be addressed by using authentic Islamic 
Theology, as displayed by the Marrakesh Declaration. This 
entails building on the Charter of Madinah, which used 
by Prophet Mohamed 1400 years ago, affirms respect for 
all Madinah  citizens without distinguishing their religious 
beliefs. The Marrakesh Declaration was signed in 2016 by 
over 300 Islamic leaders, ministers, muftis and religious 
scholars from more than 100 countries in response to the 
persecution of religious minorities, such as Christians and 
Yazidis by ISIS. The Declaration was also endorsed by the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) during their 2016 
summit in Istanbul.
The Network of Religious and Traditional Peacemakers 
bridges grassroots peacemakers and global players to work 
towards the establishment of sustainable peace, using such 
declarations in intra-religious and interreligious settings 
to promote FoRB and as tools to combat intolerance and 
discrimination based on religion or belief. 
An example of the latter is the training of Nigerian 
Religious Peacemakers in the Gombe Province of 
Northeastern Nigeria. Led by Network Secretariat Executive 
Director, Dr. Mohamed Elsanousi, the training sought to 
increase the capacity of Nigerian Christian and Muslim 
leaders to carry out  reconciliation and peacemaking 
processes. The joint teaching focused on FoRB and utilized 
the recently adopted Marrakesh Declaration to spotlight 
religious freedom for religious minorities in Muslim majority 
communities. Notably, none of the trainees had any prior 
knowledge of the Declaration and, therefore, its significance 
as a potential foundational tool to advance the religious 
freedom of religious minorities. 
Case Study 1: Strengthening FoRB through  
Religious Argumentation: The Marrakesh Declaration  
as a Basis for on-the-ground Trainings of Imams
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The Network provided Gombe religious leaders with methods 
and tools on how to teach Christians and Muslims an 
alternative way of being authentically religious, in order to 
counter practices promoted by Boko Haram. Over the four 
days of training, a variety of topics were discussed, ranging 
from theological perspectives in interreligious dialogue and 
peacebuilding, to Christian and Muslim collaboration to 
address the threat of terrorism in Nigeria. The most notable 
outcome of the training was the commitment of all 60 
pastors and Imams who participated to create core groups in 
their own houses of worship in order to continue spreading 
the training’s message. The core groups will meet separately 
in their localities to develop interreligious peacemaking 
programs, promote peacemaking and combat intolerance and 
discrimination in their respective congregations.
Similarly, the Network utilized the Marrakesh Declaration 
in its Theological Training on Peacebuilding and Inter-
religious Dialogue for Imams in the Central African 
Republic (CAR). In a context strained by five years of 
violence, often portrayed as religiously motivated, the 
Peacemakers Network, in cooperation with Finn Church 
Aid and KAICIID, organized a three-day theological training 
in Bangui in January 2018, bringing together 33 Imams 
from all provinces of the CAR. Under the leadership of 
two Moroccan scholars, the Imams, representing different 
regions of the country, explored Islamic concepts of 
peacebuilding and inter-religious dialogue, including the 
Marrakesh Declaration.
CAR’s National Reconciliation Cabinet Director from the 
Ministry for Social Affairs and the President of the Alliance 
of Evangelicals in CAR also attended the theological training. 
In addition to peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue, the 
training in Bangui focused on increasing the commitment of 
Muslim leaders to intra-Muslim unity by using their crucial 
role in society to endorse peaceful messages.
To this effect, the training was deemed very successful as 
it brought together Imams, who once objected to working 
together, expressed a newfound willingness to collaborate 
in the future, and noted that they were better equipped to 
address issues in their communities at the grassroots level. 
To learn more about the Marrakesh Declaration,  
visit www.marrakeshdeclaration.org.
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K E Y  T A K E A W A Y S  A N D 
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
•  Policy makers should use widely recognized 
theological contents to support communication 
and advocacy strategies, particularly in the area of 
education curricula. The Marrakesh Declaration is one 
of the most powerful of these tools and deserves a 
concerted effort by policy makers to raise awareness 
of its significance as an effective tool for establishing 
harmonious conviviality in Muslim-majority countries. 
•  Policy makers should make space for civil society 
(track 1.5 collaborations) when advancing FoRB as a 
policy priority. They should focus more on highlighting 
the positive examples of initiatives by religious actors 
that promote FoRB rather than primarily focusing on 
reports of  worldwide persecution. By doing so, policy 
makers can win the hearts and minds of religious 
actors who are working hard to advance FoRB and 
break their sense of isolation.
•  The human rights agenda and the alliance of tolerant 
interpretations of religious traditions can merge 
together, as demonstrated by the UN Plan of Action 
for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement 
to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes and 
the UN Faiths for Rights framework. The need for 
policy makers from various governments to follow up 
with their implementation of concrete polices based 
on the above is crucial. 
•  Policy makers must  be aware of the language 
used when promoting FoRB – for example, FoRB 
advocacy needs to be more context-specific and 
customized to the local culture while maintaining 
focus on its outcomes. Furthermore, there are 
many nuances surrounding FoRB, and the way its 
mentioned in certain contexts, such as used by the 
West, can be seen as part of a missionary agenda 
and fomenting proselytism. The use of concepts like 
religious pluralism and inter-religious harmony may 
be preferable and more effective in such situations. 
Contextual understanding needs to be translated to 
effective local policy. 
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The Universal Code of Conduct on Holy Sites (Universal 
Code) was launched in 2011, by a quartet of non-
government organizations (NGOs), Search for Common 
Ground, the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, 
One World in Dialogue, and Religions for Peace, after 
a three-year development process in consultation with 
senior leaders from diverse religions and faiths worldwide. 
The Universal Code maps out a practical code of conduct 
and policies for holy sites globally, seeking to preserve 
sacred places, ensure the safety of believers and stimulate 
interreligious cooperation. 
Since its launch, the Universal Code has matured into a 
dynamic initiative with field projects throughout the world 
and has proven to be a useful tool that naturally adapts 
to the needs of the local context. Field projects range 
from educational and training activities to monitoring and 
research. 
In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and frequent 
violence around holy sites, Search for Common Ground’s 
Jerusalem office, together with the Jerusalem Intercultural 
Center, and with the endorsement of the Council of 
Religious Institutions of the Holy Land, began a field 
project in 2015 entitled Window on Mount Zion. Working 
with religious actors, relevant authorities and local NGOs, 
the goal was to reduce interreligious tensions and build 
cooperation as well as to protect places of worship. Mount 
Zion, just outside Jerusalem’s Old City walls, is a crucial 
location given its shared holy site to Jews, Christians and 
Muslims - the Tomb of King David – known to Muslims as 
Nabi Daud – and the Room of the Last Supper. Centuries 
long conflict over ownership and religious rights on Mount 
Zion, fuelled by rivalry and intolerance, as well as more 
recent religiously motivated hate crimes, had resulted in an 
atmosphere of mistrust, suspicion and violence. The Window 
on Mount Zion initiative presented a shift in perspective, 
believing that “when conflict is handled constructively, it can 
generate progress”, thus bringing about positive change. 
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Case Study 2: The Universal Code of Conduct  
on Holy Sites & the Case of Mount Zion
With this perspective in mind, the Window on Mount Zion 
initiative set out to promote interreligious dialogue and 
collaboration via the following three components: (1) 
recruiting local religious leaders, identifying their shared 
goals and concerns, and finding collaborative solutions; 
(2) establishing a body of volunteers to help maintain 
a harmonious atmosphere on site; and (3) organizing 
workshops and visits for police officers and youth to increase 
interreligious understanding. 
Specifically, this entails quarterly tenants’ meetings of 
representatives from the various religious institutions with 
relevant government ministries, the municipality and the 
police as observers, at which residents explore shared 
issues and take collective action. These meetings have 
resulted in a joint condemnation of hate crimes, the 
enlistment of authorities to repair safety hazards, improved 
police security as well as discussion of a common vision 
for Mount Zion, which would have been inconceivable 
prior to the project. In addition, Window on Mount Zion 
actively recruits and utilizes volunteers to reduce tensions 
at religious events on the Mount by offering guidance and 
explanations to visitors and pilgrims. Furthermore, the Old 
City Police Force, comprising 250 officers, took part in 
workshops that provided professional training on religious 
sensitivities and the attachments of the different religions to 
the shared holy site. In 2016 for the first time ever, religious 
leaders on Mount Zion jointly denounced the desecration of 
the Dormition Abbey located on Mount Zion. As the initiative 
also focuses on youth education, between 2016-2018 over 
1,000 Israeli high school and pre-army students participated 
in experiential tours of the shared holy site on Mount Zion 
while exploring the rich heritage of the Abrahamic religions 
at the location. Additionally, hundreds of Palestinian youth 
have taken part in tours of Jerusalem’s Old City to expand 
understanding of the religious attachments of the different 
religions to their sacred spaces.
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K E Y  T A K E A W A Y S  A N D 
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
•  Both the development of the Universal Code 
and the various field projects would not have 
been implemented without funding from various 
international governments and quasi-government 
institutions. Policy makers have also provided advice 
and help in the international domain as the NGOs 
have sought to build international state support for 
the Universal Code. At the same time, it is essential 
that government funding for activities relating to 
contested holy sites and indeed for interreligious 
engagement projects in general, are provided by a 
neutral third party that is not perceived as partisan by 
the parties to the conflict. 
•  Sustainable solutions to interreligious conflict are 
built on trust and finding common ground which takes 
time, patience and inclusivity. This is best carried out 
by a non-governmental organization that does not 
advocate a specific political stance.
•  Despite the above risk, relevant state authorities, 
whether national and/or local, are important 
stakeholders. Attacks on holy sites can greatly 
exacerbate tensions in a conflict, with Jerusalem’s 
Old City as a prime example of this manifestation. 
The task then is to ensure that involvement of these 
stakeholders’ support, and not detract from, the 
goals of the initiative. In the Window on Mount Zion 
project, religious actors played the main lead, with 
representatives of national and local authorities, as 
well as the police, providing a supporting role. In this 
way mutual trust was built and the religious leaders 
took ownership of the process.
•  Institutionalizing best practices in order to sustain 
them is an important role of the state. Constructive 
educational programmes for youth, police and 
other professionals that are proven to have reduced 
interreligious tensions need to be incorporated into 
school curricula on a regular basis. 
As one project volunteer powerfully put it: ‘I was at the 
entrance of the Room of the Last Supper, guiding the 
movement of tourists instead of the police. Christians can 
see that a Jew is trying to help them. They see a good 
Jewish example’. and he was echoed by a similar feedback 
by an Israeli police officer :“This training should be included 
in police colleges as basic training for all police who work in 
the Old City. It is very good and helpful.” 
As the Window on Mount Zion initiative is now recognized 
as a model for religious coexistence, Search for Common 
Ground is using its learnings to expand the Universal Code’s 
reach to other locations around the world. As Search says, 
this approach works in improving collaborative actions 
across faiths and building mutual respect on issues relating 
to holy sites. Additionally, the quartet of NGOs has, as a 
goal, to encourage international state organizations such as 
the UN to develop resolutions in the spirit of the Universal 
Code for the protection of holy sites world-wide.
To learn about the Universal Code of Conduct on Holy Sites, 
visit https://www.codeonholysites.org/
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The Faith and Belief Forum (F&BF) is a UK based grassroots 
interfaith organisation that seeks to strengthen social 
cohesion and interfaith relations through a range of targeted 
projects in schools, universities and communities. Rather 
than addressing specific violations of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief, their programmes attempt to address the 
root causes of division and religious intolerance by equipping 
learners; building movement and projecting voices. By 
focusing on youth, F&BF aims to strengthen social cohesion 
by increasing the capacity of participants to influence their 
communities. In particular, grassroots programmes aim to 
develop the skillset of participants in relation to interfaith 
engagement through collaborative approaches. 
The innovative and UN award winning ParliaMentors 
programme has particular potential to reduce religious 
intolerance by creating a mutually beneficial fora for 
university students within the UK to cooperate in order 
to realise their aims. Students of different faith and 
belief (including non-belief) backgrounds are brought 
together to collaboratively develop, implement and deliver 
a social action project. Participants receive practical 
training, are supported by F&BF, NGOs and ParliaMentors 
alumni to deliver the project and receive mentoring from 
Members of Parliaments (MPs) or Peers. Over the past 
decade, approximately 450 students have completed the 
ParliaMentors programme although participants’ involvement 
in F&BF’s work frequently extends past the period of the 
programme – most notably, as alumni mentors and through 
the F&BF’s Interfaith Summit. 
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Case Study 3: ParliaMentors: Building Inter-faith  
Youth Leadership and Active Citizen Participation
The programme directly responds to a need identified by 
F&BF to give younger people a political voice and provide 
leadership opportunities. By equipping students with diverse 
faith and belief backgrounds to take an active role in their 
communities and developing key leadership skills, the 
ParliaMentors programme aims to strengthen opportunities 
for effective citizen participation and recognises the civic 
role that interreligious dialogue and collaboration can play, 
especially amongst youth. 
As explained by one ParliaMentors participant: “Whether it’s 
a religious identity or a cultural identity or a national identity, 
people will have different identities and I think that’s what’s 
great certainly about this country in that so many people 
from different religions have worked together and come 
together and that’s something I think we need to respect... 
I think as a society slowly we are moving more towards 
people being open about their identity whatever that might 
be. And I think it always is an essential part of any person to 
understand really who they are.” 
While the F&BF run the project independently, they are 
dependent on partnerships across all major political parties 
in the UK, in order to recruit MPs and Peers as mentors. 
This creates opportunities for future leaders to get involved 
in political life by attending meetings in Westminster and the 
constituency, providing shadowing opportunities and access 
to political events. It also provides space for increased 
conversations about faith and belief in the political arena 
and raises awareness of the existence of MPs and Peers of 
faith and how this influences their work. In so doing it aims 
to overcome the sense of exclusion from political processes 
that is often keenly felt by youth of different faith and belief 
backgrounds. By engaging future leaders of faith or belief 
(including non-believers) who draw on their faith or belief 
in order to approach the challenges posed by diversity, the 
ParliaMentors programme aims to move past the secular 
language used by government to recognise the positive 
societal role that faith and belief can play. 
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K E Y  T A K E A W A Y S  A N D 
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
•  The support and active engagement of politicians 
with the ParliaMentors programme is central to its 
success. 
•  By bringing together future leaders in order to develop 
a social action project, ParliaMentors facilitate the 
engagement of participants who might otherwise not 
wish to discuss their identity but are more willing to 
express their values through action. 
•  The pursuit of a joint collaborative goal can serve to 
bring people together in a much more powerful way 
than only speaking to one another and the bonds 
created through shared work lead to much more open 
and deep discussions about identity later on in a 
group’s time together.
•  In order to increase its reach and impact, the 
programme only selects a small number of students 
identified as well connected, engaged, young, 
emerging leaders in faith communities, who might not 
otherwise have access to traditional power structures. 
•  By developing key leadership skills alongside 
interreligious dialogue and collaboration, the potential 
for outcomes to be generalized from the individual to 
the community level is greatly increased.
•  By providing space for conversations around faith and 
belief in the political arena, this type of programme 
increases the accessibility of leadership roles to 
youth of faith, who might otherwise feel alienated by 
politics. 
•  A clear strategy for sustained alumni engagement 
is needed to ensure that the skills developed during 
the programme are not lost afterwards. Interfaith 
engagement shouldn’t be about one off events or 
interventions. Over time trust is built, and can lead to 
deeper, more meaningful work
•  The nature of the programme and its focus on social 
action means that there is potential for it to be 
replicated in a number of different contexts. 
While the project is based in the UK and engages UK 
politicians, it is partnered with the British Council Active 
Citizens Programme which is a global social leadership 
programme working with partner organisations across the 
world. Through this, participants connect with emerging 
leaders from other countries and have a chance to meet 
them through ‘International Study Visits’. Consequently, in 
addition to forging ties between faith and belief communities 
at a national level, the ParliaMentors programme also aims 
to forge ties internationally and highlights the potential 
replicability of this programme in different contexts. 
The type of grassroots programmes offered by the F&BF are 
central to successful interreligious engagement activities. 
By bringing together groups of students of different faiths 
and beliefs to cooperatively deliver a common aim, the 
design of the programme meets many of the prerequisites 
for successful collaboration. While faith and belief identity 
may not be central to the specific collaborative activity, 
this diversity remains at the centre of the programme. 
Notably, the initiation and organisation of an annual 
Interfaith Summit by ParliaMentor participants highlights 
that equipping young people to engage with others different 
to themselves in pursuit of a common social goal, further 
down the line allows them to tackle more sensitive issues 
surrounding faith and belief. By providing leadership training 
and mentoring, ParliaMentor also increases the capacity of 
participants to take up leadership roles in their communities 
and influence debate about faith and belief. In so doing, the 
potential for the outcomes of the project to be generalized 
from the individual to the community level is greatly 
increased. 
Further information ParliaMentors can be found on F&BF 
website: https://faithbeliefforum.org
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Recommendations
OSCE participating States have committed to advancing FoRB and pursuing 
interfaith and interreligious dialogue and partnerships for this purpose. In order 
to fulfil their obligations and fully utilise interreligious engagement, the following 
recommendations are emphasized for policy makers:
I DENT I F Y 
interreligious engagement as a priority in Ministries of Foreign Affairs’ strategy 
 to protect FoRB, combat intolerance and promote sustainable peace;
ESTABL ISH 
funding streams in different government departments for the implementation of interreligious 
engagement strategies. It may be beneficial in certain contexts to explore links with other relevant 
agendas, for example, the SDGs and counter-narrative;
RECOGN IZE 
that if interreligious engagement is to advance FoRB, human rights must be viewed  
as mutually reinforcing and high-level interreligious dialogue must be strategically coupled with 
interreligious collaboration on the ground;
H IGHL IGHT 
the growing best practices in relation to interreligious actions, especially those  
led by young religious citizens and invest in training and educational programmes  
for a new generation of interreligious youth leadership;
RECOGN IZE 
that interreligious engagement does not have to be State-sponsored and initiatives by civil society 
organizations and religious or belief communities should be encouraged. States should seek to 
facilitate interreligious engagement through the provision of facilities and infrastructure; 
RECOGN IZE 
that States must remain impartial and, therefore, must not discriminate between communities, 
seek to influence religious doctrine or use interreligious engagement to further a political agenda. 
States must not use coercive measures to force religious or belief communities to engage in 
interreligious engagement against their will;
ENSURE 
that interreligious dialogue and collaboration is inclusive, especially by encouraging  
the participation of women and reaching out beyond the usual suspects;
GUARANTEE 
that interreligious dialogue and collaboration is designed with the specific context in mind.  
In particular, the context should determine the appropriateness of using the language of human 
rights or instead identifying common values that transcend specific religions or beliefs; 
OSCE should task ODIHR with preparing guiding principles and a collection of good practices  
on interfaith and interreligious dialogue and partnerships for OSCE participating States.
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Europe Area Public Affairs, The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
Yousif Al-Khoei 
Director of Public Affairs, Al-Khoei 
Foundation 
HE Archbishop Angaelos 
Coptic Orthodox Archibishop of London 
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon 
Minister of State & UK Special Envoy 
on FoRB, FCO
Yousif Al-Khoei 
Executive Director, Al-Khoei Foundation 
Belsame Matoussi 
Coexister 
Melanie Barbato 
University of Münster
Armando Barucco 
Head of Policy Planning Unit,  
Italian MFA
Jean Christophe Bas 
Founder and CEO, The Global Compass 
Mike Battcock 
Civil Society Team Leader, UK DFID
Peter Bender 
University of Kassel
Paola Bernardini 
Holy Cross College
Stephanie Berry
FoRB&FPI, University of Sussex
Gregorio Bettiza 
University of Exeter 
Judd Birdsall 
Managing Director, Cambridge Institute 
on Religion & International Studies 
Ugo Boni
Italian MFA
Giovanni Brauzzi 
Italian MFA
Michela Carboniero
Italian MFA
Jocelyne Cesari 
University of Birmingham,  
Georgetown University  
Roberto Colamine 
Head of Africa Office,  
Italian MFA
Zoila Combalía
Universidad de Zaragoza and OSCE/
ODIHR Panel of Experts on FoRB
Simona Cruciani 
Office on Genocide Prevention and 
the Responsibility to Protect, United 
Nations
Fadi Daou 
Chair and CEO, Adyan Foundation 
Emanuela Claudia Del Re 
Deputy Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation 
Adama Dieng 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide, United Nations 
Elena Dini 
University of Roma Tre
Michael Driessen 
John Cabot University  
Marta Dionisio 
Italian MFA
Cole Durham 
Brigham Young University
Mohamed Elsanousi 
Executive Director, The Network for 
Religious and Traditional Peacemakers
Izzedin Elzir
Italian Union of Islamic Communities
Sir Malcolm Evans 
University of Bristol 
Pasquale Ferrara
Italian Ambassador to Algeria 
Silvio Ferrari
University of Milan 
Jan Figel 
Special Envoy for FoRB outside the EU, 
European Commission 
Steven Fisher 
Joint Head, Human Rights Policy Unit, 
UK FCO 
Joelle Fiss
OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on FoRB
Luca Fratini
Deputy Permanent Representative, 
Mission of Italy to the OSCE
Paolo Frizzi 
Sophia University Institute
Margaret Galy
Head of FoRB, UK FCO
Mauro Garofalo 
Head of International Relations, 
Community of Sant’Egidio
Jessica A. Giles 
Open University  
M. Christiane Green 
Center for the Study of Law and 
Religion
Gwen Griffith-Dickson 
Executive Director, Lokahi Foundation 
Khataza Gondwe 
Christian Solidarity Worldwide 
Julian Hargreaves 
The Woolf Institute
 
Harriet Hoffler 
Wilton Park 
Steve Hucklesby 
Senior Adviser, the Methodist Church/
JPIT 
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Ozcan Keles 
Chairperson of the Dialogue Society & 
University of Sussex
Edward Kessler 
Founder Director, the Woolf Institute 
John Kinahan 
Forum 18 
David Kirkham 
Brigham Young University 
Emir Kovacevic
OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on FoRB
Neville Kyrke-Smith 
National Director, Aid to the Church in 
Need UK 
Thomas Lawo 
Senior Advisor, PaRD
Stephen Lloyd 
UK Member of Parliament 
Maria Mancinelli
FoRB&FPI, University of Sussex
Kishan Manocha 
Senior Advisor on FoRB, OSCE/ODIHR 
Laura Marks
Co-Chair, Nisa Nashim 
Katherine Marshall 
Georgetown University 
Salvatore Martinez 
OSCE Chairperson
Alberto Melloni 
Director, John XXIII Foundation for 
Religious Studies
Francis Messner 
University of Strasbourg
 
Nicola Missaglia 
Italian Institute for International 
Political Studies
Rubina Nasser 
Vice-President, Ahmadiyya Muslim 
Women’s Association 
Lizzie Nelson 
Uk Director, Search for Common 
Ground 
Chanel Noel
Faith and Belief Forum
Luca Ozzano 
University of Turin 
 
Yahya Sergio Yahe Pallavicini 
President, COREIS Islamic Religious 
Community of Italy 
 
Jean-Christoph Peaucelle 
Advisor for Religious Affairs,  
French MFA
Fabio Petito
FoRB&FPI, University of Sussex
 
Fabrizio Petri 
President, Interministerial Committee 
for Human Rights, Italian MFA
Sharon Rosen 
Global Director, Religious Engagement, 
Search for Common Ground 
Alessandro Rossi
Network for Religious and Traditional 
Peacemakers
Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin 
Special Representative for FoRB, 
Danish MFA
 
Carl Söderbergh 
Director of Policy & Communications, 
Minority Rights Group 
Lord Suri of Ealing 
Member of House of Lords
Helen Teasdale
UK Delegation to the OSCE
Jeroen Temperman
Erasmus University Rotterdam and 
OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on FoRB
Katherine Thane 
All-Party Parliamentary Group for 
International FoRB 
Claire Thomas 
Interim Executive Director, Minority 
Rights Group 
Scott Thomas
University of Bath 
Adam Tickell 
Vice-Chancellor, University of Sussex 
Stephen Timms 
UK Member of Parliament & Labour 
Party’s Faith Envoy 
Monica Duffy Toft 
Tufts University 
Sophie-Hélène Trigeaud 
University of Strasbourg
Arturo Varvelli
Italian Institute for International 
Political Studies
Marco Ventura
University of Siena and OSCE/ODIHR 
Panel of Experts on FoRB
Lord Wallace of Saltaire 
Member of House of Lords 
James Walters 
London School of Economics 
Michael Wiener 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
Erin Wilson 
University of Groningen
Mikolaj Wrzecionkowski 
Associate Officer on FoRB, OSCE/
ODIHR
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